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Speech of Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
For rel<::ase on delivery

Feb r uary 1, 1955

THE SCUTHEAST A3IA cnL LECTIVE DEFENSE
TREATY

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed in Manila on
September 8, 1954 has

~.,ecn

submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee and

reported to the Senate fer its approval.

This treaty will be another milestone

in the evolution of our policy to try and create a solid collective-security
system in the V:estern Pacific and Southeast Asia areas.
It was my distinct pleasure, along with my distinguished

~o ll eague,

the senior Senator from New Jersey, Mr. Smith, to represent the Senate
at this conference .

Before I turn to the various sections and provisions of

the Tr(..aty itself, I wish to n1ake note of the outstancing jo 1) that Secretary of
State, John F0ster Dulles, and his party did at Manita, caj·rying out the
policies of our nation on a bipartisan, statesmanlike basis .

The Secretary of

State and Senator S•n ith are to be highly commended for the work th !Y did th0re .
The So utheast Asian treaty is another part in the total

pc..tt~rn

strength which we have been trying to create throughout the free world.

of
The

armistice agreements at Geneva did not end the need for a pact in the Southeast
Pacific area; rather it emphasized it.

':'he need for the collective security

pact becomes more apparent each day as the aggressive tendencies on the part
of the Communists become more evident.

The nations at the Manila Conference

have recognized this fact and have endeavored to form a bulwark against the
aggressive intcnti0ns on the part of the Chinese Communists.
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Th

members

! the treaty orgar!.:.atton
~ealand,

Thailand, Pakis tan, Australia , New

a r c~

the Phtlippines,

France, the Unttcd Kmgdom

and the United States .
Eicht member nations, and only thret..: of

th~m

Asian, ttlay

be an insignificar t nu.nber {cor a Southeastern Asia treat)', but it

lS

s~.:

m to

sufiici\!nl

to start a v ry substantial defens.:! build-up aga inst the Commumst menace in
Asia.

Admittedly, we would have been glad if there were more Asian members,

but the door is not closed to them .

Whcncv, r thc&e nations, within the C"Onfincs

of the treaty area, wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to join, they may
do so, the only prerequisite being the concurrence of the present members .
As a dari!ying note, I will say that

th~

name o f any future members will be

suomitted to the Scnat..:: for approval .
''lhcn the delegations met in Manila, prhJr to the signing of this
momt ntous document, the delegates had three major ar..:-as in which tn find
solutiono: the dcfinilion of thl: tr .. aty area, how nntch cmphasiG

~(

>1 1.cc on

the probh m of subversion, and the l:Conomic clause, if there was i:o L ... one.
The treaty area is ddined in the treaty itself and also in a protocol
to the treaty which brings in Laos, Camuodia, and tltc free portion of Vietnam
as treaty territory which, if attad cd, would be under the protection of the
treaty .

Those nations themselves are not members of the Manila Pact.

The

reason is that the armistice p r ovisions at Geneva at least raised a question
in the :ninds of some of the parties to those agrccm nts as to whether the
Associated States could actually join such a pact.

Nevertheless, those states
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welcomed the fact that the mantle of p1·ot •. ctivn of the Treaty was thrown
around this arl;a.
Broadly speaking, the treaty area includes the territory of the parties
and the Pacific Ocean area which is south of 21 degrees anu 30 minutes; that
is a line which runs north of the Philippines .

The area therefore is Pakir:tan,

Thailand and l>y protocol, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, :rvlalaya, Austr ali:-t,
New Zealand and the Philippines .
ar~a.

This treaty docs not cove r the Hong Kong

Formosa, Jal-Jan or Ko r ea.
The major difference in this t r 0aty from any otlwr security treaty

is that it placl:S

1

1ore e -,phasis on the danger of subversion .

It de al s of

course, as other trl.aties have, with an open armed attack and it is hoped that
what is said in this respect will constitute a deterrent against such an act 0f
aggression .
The problem of subve r sion is dealt with more
other

tr ~ aty.

as such.

spccific,~l.y

t-han in any

Cubversion in this area is very stronr. and it has t-,,, : : ecogt'ized

The signatories are planning a mee t ing in Bangkok

la~~.: ~·1~:=:

mN.th

at which time they can begin to think of ways and means to meet the s·t·)versivc
threat which is recognized by the

t r ~a ty

as being a par ticul ar danger

i:1

this area.

The proposal before the Senate is a significant new undertaking providing for mutual aid to prevent and counter subversive activity directed from
the outside against the territorial integrity and political stability of the member
states.

The situation, in Indochina in particular, is by no means satis fa c to r y

at the present time although it is improvinr,, and it is hoped that somethin g
fruitful will come from the l3angl•.ok rqcelinp,.

-~ T 1c treaty has a bri !

cuno

1c clau .. c which say

wtll c operate together in cconom1c matters.

that th

parti s

Sccrl.llary D 111 s made

1t

cl ar,

when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Cor 1mittce in i ovemb r,
as he did in Manila, that this is not meant to and docs not bind the United
States to any particular program of vast economic and military aid.
The situation in Europe after Y/orld "ar II was quite diffe rent lha11
the one which exists in Asia today.

In Europe our aid programs h e lped to

recreate something that had been destroyed .
who were well

v~.:

rsed in industrial lif'"' and

'Tc

th ~..:y

were wor 1d.ng with people

needed a big hoost to get on

their feet again.
In Asia the problem is to create surnething that is totally new.

Our

first problem under this clause is to find a proper means to help before su1r:3
of m ney arc

r~quested.

There ar ... a number of economic problcrr.s of acut\.)

ncce3sity in Southeast Asia, particularly in free Vietnam.

It is

~,'

thal a report will be forthcoming frorn the Admini:;t•·ation when-:.
of approach has been for 1nulated.

ThiG proposal merely

rccog-:1~ ·.

~

:mdt.;ro;tanding

( :.r.ite rlr.n
:::

.·~c

cc,momic problem and lays the gt'uund wor:c
fhc treaty ends with a declaration that the arml.!d
is referred to and which the United States
own peace and

s~.~curity

dcclar~.:3

aggrcssio~ '·~lc 1

would be

would be Communist aggression.

dangcrou~

to its

There was a great

deal of disc.ussion at the Conference as to whether the treaty, as a whole,
should be e:>·clusivcly directed against Communist aggression or wheth\! r it
should dea.l with any form of aggression.

The tlnitcd States do~ s not have any
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territory in the treaty area aud therefcn·e we arc not interested in inte rnal
quarrels as such.

Our interests would b ,') involved only if there should be

Communist aggression.

The other countries were unwilling to limit the treaty

t0 C:omrnunist aggression, so the issue was resolved by the United States
including in the treaty a declaration that as far as it was conc0rned the open
aggression which we would regard as dangerous to our peace and security
would be Co.nmunist aggression.

As a compensation the United States has

agreed that if there should bl;) local controversies in the area, we would join
with others in consultation to see what should or could be done to alleviate
the ·n.

This treaty is ai ned primarily at Co.nmunist aggression, not at diffi-

culties that might arise

b~tween

friendly states.

At the conclusion of the l\1anila Conference the Pacific Charter war;
issned.

It is in the nature of a declaration which is very import-:~.~t ir· that it

expresses by joint action of so-called western col onial powc1·s

&.!":~

1i"!n Asian

powers, a comnon position with reference to self-determinati0•· .. ·' -::dfgovernmcnt by the peoples of Asia .

This document was sugges 1 c :_

l

1 ·,:---':'e , 1-!r t

Magsaysay , an outstanding statesman and l eader, who exerted a g::.·ee> ~ J0al cf
influence during the entire conference.

He thought that it would oe

'-l:;e. .:t'l

fo -..

the Conference to draw up what he called a Pacific Charter dcclaratior:.
affirr.1ing the intention of all th;) parties to this treaty to work for $Clfdeter rr1ination and self-government among the Asian peoples who wanted selfgovernment and were capable of exercising its responsibilities .
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Chart r

1

a

1

abl

of those cone rn d.

ach1 \

~.;nt

1n b rtng

1

g

This d cu lent should ha\

th r th
a gr at d al o f

impact.
r. President, as my colleagues here kt ov. , 1t is n t n ccssary for
the Pacific Cha rter to be submitted to the Senate fo r a c tio n.
One of the first questions to arise out of nny discussion of thi s

th

w

tr c n ty is: what is the mnjor differenc e between the Southeast Asia Collccth·c
Defens e Treaty and NATO '?
First of all, the North P tlantic Treaty O rganizati o n

\/3S

built up as a

dcfcns i''l: force or. the contit.ent o f Eu ropl' , a force st r ong eno ugh to r es ist
attac 1< by the ar mies of th e Soviet Union.
east Asia Treaty.

That is not the purpose o f the Sothh-

This new treaty docs not dedicate any m aj o r elcmet.t<; of ·,..,

Unite d States Military Establishment to form any army of dcfcns
Acco rding to the
upon

th~..:

Sccr~tary

1

of State's t est imo ny, in this ar ea "we r

deterrent of o ur mobile striking rpowcr."

the Far East would be an

:J is a1· a.

ov~.,;rcxtcnsion

A NATO typ• ,..

~rimal'ily

1 ,- •

·~l'\tio 1

:r

of o ur military pow er a s ·.

This new treaty follows a f o ramla simila1· to that used iu
Treaty, the An?.us Treaties and the t<or..!an T1·caty.

~i1c

1his avoids the

which aro s e during the ucbatc over the NATO tr e aty r e lative to tht.

.'' :.i.:>£ h ..
1!Jt· -~

po·...,e-:~

of the

President and the Congrcs s.
The h.:ss contro\',;rsial language d ec lares that an intrusion in the tr ea t y
area would be dang.::rous to our peace and scc· tri ty and that we \/Ould, in that
event, act to meet th e common dange r in accor,lancc with ou r constitutional

-

p roc esses .

The

r-rj\ T~

...
t

-

treaty says that "au attack on one is an attack on all. 11

The fo r "ne r m ay not be as automatic, depending on the circumstances, but it
avoids any constitutional controversy and it 5te.ns fr om one of our o ldes t for eign
policies, the :.'-1rn r ce Doctrine .
The 3uutheast .Asia Co lle ctive Def e ns e Treaty is consistent with the
provisions cf the United Nations Chart er .

This treaty would come unde r the

provisions of article 51, providing that nothiug contained in the UN Charter
shall deprive any of the states fro m the individual o r co llective right of selfd efense .

Unde r article 51, regional

~.;nforcernent

me asur es do not n ee d prior

ap pr::. val o f the Security Council, where the .Sovie t Unio n has a veto.
One of the most fruitful things to co me out of this confe r ence was
the initiative shown by the Asians thems e l ves.

The Filippinos, our l o n g -tir'l..,.

fri ends , were hosts and the Asian d e l egat es contributed irmnens ,•.: in workir.g
out the f o r m that the treaty was to take.
In c on clusion I wish to stress again the impor tan ce o!
the Pacific Charte r.
in the P acific ar e a.

They are needed steps in building

~·

.": ···.·a--_':·f

securi~y. ~

;:

···~ ···.'·t;

I sincerely hope th at the fJcn ate will give its p.:01 •1-S

appr oval and ratification .

<:.'1~

Speech of Senator Mike
For rdease on delivery

THE

~viansfield

SC"'UTIE~AST

(D., Montana)

February 1, 1955

ASIA Cr 1 1 LECTIVE DEFENJE
TRE~TY

The Southeast Asia Collective Dcf...:nse Treaty signed in Manila on
September 8, 1954 has '1e c n sub"T1itted to the Foreign Relations Committee and
reported to the Senate fe r its approval.

This treaty will be another milestone

in the evolution e f our po Ucy to try and create a solid collective-security
system i:l the

1

estern Pacific and Southeast Asi.a areas.

I t was my distinct pleasure, along vlith my distinguished colleague,
the senior Senator fr om New Jersey, Mr. Smith, to represent the Senate
at this conferenc e: .

Before I turn to the various sections and provisions of

the Treaty its e lf, I wish to ,11ake n o te of the outstaneing jo'? that Secretary of
State, John F osle r Dulles, and his party did at Man:ta, carryint; out t!1e
policies of ou r nation on a bipartisan, statesmanlike basis.

The

Sccr~tary

State and Senat or S 11ith are to be highly comm e nde d for the W(• rk th
The Southeast Asian treaty is ano ther part in the t o tal

~y

~C'..tt~rP

strength which we have been trying to creat e throughout the fre e w0 rld.
armistice agreements at Geneva did no t end the need for a pact in
Pacific area; rather it emphasized it.

'!'h~.:

th ~

of

did the rc.
of
The

So utheast

need for the collective security

pact becomes mo re ap parent each day as the aggressive t e ndencies on the part
of the Com munis t;; become morl.! evident .

The nations at the Mar.ila Confe rence

have recognized this fact and have en deavor ed to form a bulwark against the
aggressive intonti-:::ns on the part

l

f the Chine oc Communists.
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The members o! the tr aty

o r gari.~ation

arc: Ute Philippines,

Thailand, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, France, the Umtcd l{mgdom
and the United States.
E1ght member nations, and only thrcl; of them As1an, rnny sccn1 t
be an insignificar t nu.nbcr f<• r a Southeastern Asia treaty, but it is sufficient
to start a vr.:.ry substantial defense build-up against the Commnniot menace in
Asia.

Admittedly, we would have be0n glacl if

but the door is not closed to them.

th ~..:

re were more A sian members,

Whcncv\'r these nations, within the c-onfines

of the treaty area, wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to join, they may
do so, the only prerequisite being the concurrence of the present members .
As a clarifying note, I will say that

th~

name of any future members will be

submitted to the Senate for approval.
When the delegations met in Manila, prior lo the signir.g of this
morn1:ntous document, the delegates had thrl;c major ar0as in which to find
solutiono: the definition of the treaty area, how much emphasis

~r

>11.c,• un

the pl·oblcm of subversion, and the economic clause, if th...:rc waA to t c one.
The treaty area is defined in the treaty its0lf and also in a protocol
to the tr..:aty which brings in Laos, Cam "..India, and the free portion c-f Vietnam
as treaty territory which, if attacked, would be under the protection of the
treaty.

Those nations themselves arc not :ne"l'lbcrs of the :\1anila Pact.

The

r eason is that the armistice provisions at G, n ... va at least raised a question
in the minds of some of the parties to those agr"'cmcnts as to whether the
Associated States could actually join such a pact.

Ncvcrthcl ... ss, those states
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welcomed the fact that the mantle of

pl·ot.~ction

of the Treaty was thrown

around this area.
3roadly speaking, the treaty area includes the territory of the parties
and the Pacific Ocean area which is south of 21 degrees anu 3 0 minutes; that
is a line which runs north of the Philippines .

The area therefore is Pakistan,

Thailand and 1>y protocol, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, l'vlalaya, Australia,
New Zealand and thE' Philippines.

This treaty does no t cove r the Hong Kong

area, Fortnosa, Japan or Korea .
Th<:! major diffl.!rcnce in this tr\;aty from any oth 'r security t r eaty
is that it places more emphasis on the dang<:;r of subversion.

It deals of

course, as other treaties have, with an open armed attack and it is hoped that
what is said in this rl.!spcct will constitute a deterrent against such an act of
acgression.
The problem of subversion is do..!alt with mo r e specific.ll.y tl'-an in any
other treaty.
as such.

Subversion in thin a·rca is very stronlj and it has 1:.:( :- :-ecognized

The signatories arc planning a meeting in Bangkok late::

th~c:;

mcr·.th

at which time they can begin to think of ways and means to meet the s:.1bve r sive
threat which is rccL'gnizcd by the treaty as being a particul ar danger in this area .
The proposal before the Senate is a significant new under t aking pr ovidins for mutual aid to prevent and counter subversive activity directed fr om
the outside against the territorial integrity and political stability of the member
states .

The situation, in Indochina in particular, is by no means satis fac tory

at the present time although it is impr oving , and it is hoped that something
fruitful will come from the Bangtok mce(ing.

The treaty has a br' :£ ccono

1c claua

wtll c operate together in economic matt rs.

whtch says that th

part1 a

Sccrctaq Dull s mad

1t c1

when he appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Cor:1mitt

ar,

in l'o" rnb r,

as he d' d in Manila, that this is not meant to and docs not bind th

Unit d

States to any particular program of vast economic and military aid .
The situation in Europe after \''orld Wa1· 11 was
the one which exists in Asia today.

quit~::

dH:fcrcnt than

In Eu r op'.: our aiu programs hclpc<l to

recreate something that had been destroyed .

'c were working with peopl

who were well v\.:rscd in industrial life and th y n(!cded a big hoost to get on
their feet again.
In Asia the problem is to create something that is totally new .

Our

first problem und(!r this clause is to find a proper means to help before su r:;
of money arc requested.

There aru a number of economic probicrr.s of acute

necessity in Southeast Asia, particularly in free Vh::tnam .

It is -., :mderstanding

thal a r<·porl will be forthcoming from the Admini.,tration \Jhen -;. l\;=.l"lit
of approach has lH'cn formulated .

ThiG proposal merely rc

cc no :1ic problc."t"' and lays the ground
The

tr~aly

cog:'\~"":

1lun

::; . 1h!

wor:~ .

ends with a declaration that the armed aggrcssio:1 '''.ich

is referred to and which the United Stat.:!s declares would be dangerous to its
own peace and S\.:Curity would be Communist aggl'cssion.

Thcr~

was a great

deal of discussion at the Conference as to whether the tr(!aty, as a whole,
should be c>:clusivcly directed against Communist aggression or whether it
should deal with any form of aggression.

The United States docs not have any
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territory h the treaty ar .... a a11d therefo-re we are not interested in inte rnal
quarrels as such.

Our interests WCJuld be involved only if there should be

Communist aggression.
to

Corm~unist

'The other c..>uutries were !mwilling to limit the

aggression, so the issue was

r~.:solved

tr~aty

by the Unit(.d States
conc~rncd

including in the treaty a declaration that as far as it was

the op.!n

aggression which we v1ould regard as dangerous to our peace and security
would be Co.nmunist aggression.

As a compensation the United States has

agreed that if there should be local controversies in the area, we would join
with others in consultation to sr.c what should or could be done to alleviate
them.

'This tr,•aty is ai.ned primarily at Com"11Unist aggression, not at diffi-

culties that might arise b.!tween friendly states.
At the conclusion of the l\1an ila Conference the Pacific Cbart~r wa!'i
issuL:d ,

It is in the nature of a declaration which is very

cxpr~sses

it.1port::t~t

by joint action of so-called western colonial powers

a!"'~~ t~1c

powe r s, a cor1.-non position with reference to self-determinatio.,..
govcrnmcnt by the peoples of Asia.

'This document was

iP that it

~. ~·:

su~ges .. c •:

Asian

<J0lf-

Lf >:e d·kr-t

1viagsaysay, an outstanding statesr Hln and l eadet· , who exerted a g::.·ec t d..:al of
influence during the entire conference.

He thought that it would Le

~Ge ~:ul

f r

the Conference to draw up what he cal10d a Pacific Charter declaration,
affirming the intention of all the parties to th\s treaty to work for selfdetermination and self-government among the Asian peoples who wanted selfgovernment and were capable of cxercisittg its responsibilities.

- 6 This Chart r is a

1

table achi '

viewpointe of those concerned.

n cnt m bringh g togeth r the dl' rg nt

This docu nent should hav

a gr at d .. al o f

impact.
1r. President, as my colleagues here lmov:, it is n t n ccssary for
the Pacific Charter to be submitted to the Senate for actio n.
One of the first questions to arise out of any discussion of thi s nl·W
treaty is: what is the major difference uctwecn the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty and NA'i'O?
First of all, the North!' tlantic Treaty O rgauization was built up as a
defensi·'c forc e l>n the continent o f Europe, a force strong enough to r es ist
attac 1< by the
cast Asia

armi~.:s

Tr~.:aty.

of the Soviet Union.

Soutl -

This new treaty docs not dedicate any n.aj(Jr clcmcuts oft' c

United .States Military Establishment to form any army of dcfC":ns

•

Lh~.:

That in no t lh\:l purposl. nf

According to the Secretary of

State'~

'1. ~'Hs

testimony, in this ar\;a "we r

upon th .... det,'rrent of o ur mobile stl'iking power. 11 A NATO typ••,...

1 pruna1 ily

.< · ... ~tio

the Far East would bo an ov-.:rextcnsion of our military power as · o;

This avoids th e

1

;J

-- :; ~o ~.Ly.

This new treaty follows a f o rwula similar to that used in !he • •!
Treaty, the An7.us Treatie s ar.d the l<orcan Treaty .

ar a.

i~i? l

inc

~:.:;ll~'-

which arose during the debate over the NATO treaty relative to thc.. puwe :f; o f the
President and the Congress.
The l e ss controversial language dl..!clarcs that an intrusiou in the tr cn ty
area would be dang e rous to our peace and security Clnd that we would, in that
event, act to meet th e common danger in accordance with o ur c ountitulio nal
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pr ocesses .

The J'TATS treaty says tl1at "an attack on one i s an attack o n au.••

The fo r ""ler may not be as automatic , dcpcn<.ling <'n the circumstances, r ut it
for~.:ign

avoids any constitutional controversy and it 5 te ns fr o.n one of ou r o ldes t
pc licies, the ?- fr.nroc Dcctrine .

The Southeast Asia Coll(.;ctive Defense Treaty i s consistent with the
provisions of the United Nations Charter.

This treaty would co me under the

provisions of article 51, rroviding that nothing contained in the UN Charter
shall deprive any o f the states fr om the individual o r collectiv.: right of s dfdefense.

Under article 51 , regional

cnfo rc ~.:Mcnt

rfleas ur l;S <.lo not need prior

appr c val o f the Security Council , where the .;,oviet Union has a veto .
One of the most fruitful things to come out of this confe r ence was
the initiative shown by the Asians themselves.

The Fili ppinos , our

fri C'nds , were hosts and the Asian delegates contributed

immenscl~·

lc•ng -ti t"1~

worki 11q

b

out the fo rm that the treaty was to t a ke .
In conclusion I wish to stress agaiu the importance of
the Pacific Charter.
in the Pacific a rea .

1.:: s

They ar c needed steps in building secnrhy ··;

''-·~;,<
~:

'

0

-. :::

I sinc(' r e ly hope that the Sc;nate w ill give its p.ront t

approval and ratification.

y <..'1'!
~I

l

l !

